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Weber’s concept of “rationalization” is rightly seen as the core of his mature thought. At the 
same time, there has been increasing attention to his “ambivalence” towards the rationaliza-
tion of economic, administrative and political processes, and of the conduct of life altogether.  
The themes of his nationalism and the irrational tendencies of his complex personality have 
also become increasingly prominent. While nationalism may not be per se irrational, any 
nationalist is logically compelled (at least in principle) to recognize the legitimacy of other — 
possibly opposed — nationalisms. Weber attempted to avoid this paradox of nationalism by 
stressing the particular responsibility of larger states, albeit with the problematic concept 
of the “Herrenvolk.” This article explores Weber’s nationalism and current nationalist and 
populist tendencies, in the light of his conception of sovereignty, democracy and plebisci-
tary leadership (Führerdemokratie). “Sovereignty,” I suggest, has become a shibboleth in the 
twenty-first century, notably in the US, Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Poland, and in the cur-
rent debacle in the UK. Although Weber uses the word “sovereignty” very rarely, the concept 
is at the centre of his sociology of the state and also, I suggest, of his conception of rationaliza-
tion. There is a parallel with his use of the term “nation.”
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An epic struggle between globalization and a re-
surgent nationalism is changing political identities 
and conflicts across the world. (Crouch, 2019a: 1) 1
Weber’s concept of “rationalization” is rightly seen by many as the core of his thought 
(see, for example, Brubaker, 1984; Käsler, 1979: 215ff.). At the same time, there has been 
increasing attention to his “ambivalence” (Alexander, 1987) towards the rationalization of 
economic, administrative and political processes, and to the conduct of life altogether. 2 
Whereas he had earlier been seen (with considerable reason) as a liberal by many North 
American and West German sociologists, the themes of his nationalism and the irratio-
nal tendencies of his complex personality became increasingly prominent.
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* My thanks to Simon Susen (City University, London) for comments on the original German version of 
this article. 
1. See also Outhwaite, 2020; Diamond, 2019 and, on “EUropean” cosmopolitanism, Outhwaite, 2006.
2. The paradigmatic instance is the rationalization of law as analyzed by Ihering and, following him, We-
ber. On this, see Turner and Factor (1994: 92). See also Frisby (1987) for the comparison with Simmel, who 
focused more on the culture of modernity.
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While nationalism may not be per se irrational, one cannot escape the paradox that 
any nationalist is logically compelled (at least in principle) to recognize the legitimacy of 
other — possibly opposed — nationalisms. 3 (As Turner and Factor (1984: 56) note, “We-
ber adopted Treitschke’s commitment to the glory of the nation as his own and insisted 
that this commitment is ultimately not rationally defensible.”) He attempted however in 
part to avoid this paradox of nationalism by stressing particular responsibility of larger 
states, albeit with the problematic concept of the “Herrenvolk.”
Ein an Zahl »größeres«, machtstaatlich organisiertes Volk findet sich durch die blo-
ße Tatsache, daß es nun einmal ein solches ist, vor gänzlich andere Aufgaben ge-
stellt, als sie Völkern wie den Schweizern, Dänen, Holländern, Norwegern obliegen. 
Weltenfern liegt dabei natürlich die Ansicht: ein an Zahl und Macht »kleines« Volk 
sei deshalb weniger »wertvoll« oder vor dem Forum der Geschichte weniger »wich-
tig«. Es hat nur einfach als solches andere Pflichten und eben deshalb auch andere 
Kulturmöglichkeiten. <. . .> Nur Herrenvölker haben den Beruf, in die Speichen der 
Weltentwicklung einzugreifen. (Weber, 1988: 60, 259)
Any numerically “large” nation organized as a Machtstaat finds that, thanks to these 
very characteristics, it is confronted by tasks of a quite different order from those 
devolving on other nations such as the Swiss, the Danes, the Dutch or the Norwe-
gians. There is of course a world of difference between this assertion and the view 
that a people which is “small” in numbers and in terms of power is thereby less 
“valuable” or less “important” before the forum of history. It is simply that such 
nations, by their very nature, have different obligations and therefore other cultural 
possibilities. <. . .> Only nations of masters are called upon to thrust their hands into 
the spokes of the world’s development. (Weber, 1994: 75, 269)
During or, as in this case, just after a world war, such nationalistic expressions are 
to be expected. (Durkheim, for example, wrote a polemic L’Allemagne au-dessus de tout 
(1915), in which he focused on Treitschke’s concept of the state.) Weber, who had long 
criticized Treitschke’s excesses (Weber, 1936: 174; see also Bendix and Roth (1971: 52)), 
had in 1911 somewhat self-critically referred to his own notorious lecture on the farmers 
east-of the Elbe:
Ich habe schon in meiner Freiburger Antrittsrede, so unreif sie in vielem gewe-
sen sein mag, die Souveränität nationaler Ideale auf dem Gebiete aller praktischen 
Politik, auch der sog. Sozialpolitik, in der rücksichtslosesten Weise vertreten  .  .  . 
(Weber, 1950: 454)
In my Freiburg inaugural address immature though it may have been in many re-
spects, I most outspokenly supported the sovereignty of national ideals in the area 
of all practical policies, including the so-called social policy . . . (Weber, 1975: 411)
3. Separatist nationalisms are an exception, since they necessarily contest the nationalism of the state from 
which they aim to secede.
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As Stephen Turner (2000: 17) writes, “Weber suggests that ‘the fatherland’ is . . . per-
haps the only practical serious choice, because nationalism was the only plausible ba-
sis for a mass political party that could transcend the limitations of interest politics . . .” 
Guenther Roth wrote in similar terms that “Weber’s was a nationalism embraced in good 
conscience at a time when Germany had not yet committed the crimes that would per-
manently disqualify her from making any cultural claims to political leadership” (1971: 
28). Behind this responsible (verantwortungsethisch) nationalism however lay Weber’s 
rather unreflective commitment to his “fatherland.” In 1912, for example, Weber was in-
vited by Russian students in Heidelberg to join in celebrating the 50th anniversary of 
their library (Weber, 1950: 509–510). Even on this festive occasion he apparently raised 
the possibility of a coming war and the fact that in such an event he and they would need 
to support the military activities of their respective states.
This affirmation of the “nation” was something self-evident for Weber, but for Ger-
many and other major European powers there was the further element of “historical re-
sponsibility or, in US terms, “manifest destiny.” This decisionist element of identification 
with his national state combined with what Troeltsch aptly called Weber’s “science-free 
value position.” This individualistic and in this sense modernist nationalism was shaped 
by what he came, in the second half of his active intellectual life, to conceptualize as the 
advance of rationalization and, in particular, bureaucratization: 
Wie ist es angesichts dieser Übermacht der Tendenz zur Bürokratisierung über-
haupt noch möglich, irgendwelche Reste einer in irgendeinem Sinn »individua-
listischen« Bewegungsfreiheit zu retten? Denn schließlich ist es eine gröbliche 
Selbsttäuschung, zu glauben, ohne diese Errungenschaften aus der Zeit der »Men-
schenrechte« vermöchten wir heute (auch der konservativste unter uns) überhaupt 
zu leben. (Weber, 1988: 152)
How is it at all possible to salvage any remnants of “individual” freedom of move-
ment in any sense, given this all-powerful trend towards bureaucratization? It is, 
after all, a piece of crude self-deception to think that even the most conservative 
amongst us could carry on living at all today without these achievements from the 
age of the “Rights of Man.” (Weber, 1994: 159)
In terms of practical politics, 4 this drove Weber’s critique of the reactionary class ide-
ology of the Junkers (Schluchter, 1980), despite what they had earlier done for the country 
(in both senses of the word “country”), and his (qualified) support for democracy as a 
possible source of responsible and conscientious political leadership.
Die »Demokratisierung« im Sinne der Nivellierung der ständischen Gliederung 
durch den Beamtenstaat ist eine Tatsache. Man hat nur die Wahl: in einem büro-
kratischen Obrigkeitsstaat mit Scheinparlamentarismus die Masse der Staatsbürger 
rechtlos und unfrei zu lassen und wie eine Viehherde zu »verwalten«, — oder sie 
4. See Giddens (1987: 187): “…it is difficult to resist the supposition that Weber’s preoccupation with bu-
reaucratic administration was . . . strongly influenced by the circumstances existing in Germany.”
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als Mitherren des Staates in diesen einzugliedern. Ein Herrenvolk aber — und nur 
ein solches kann und darf überhaupt Weltpolitik treiben — hat in dieser Hinsicht 
keine Wahl. (Weber, 1988: 322)
“Democratization” in the sense that the structure of social estates is being levelled 
by the state run by officials, is a fact. There are only two choices: either the mass 
of citizens is left without freedom or rights in a bureaucratic “authoritarian state” 
which has only the appearance of parliamentary rule, and in which the citizens are 
“administered” like a herd of cattle; or the citizens are integrated into the state by 
making them its co-rulers. A nation of masters (Herrenvolk) — and only such a na-
tion can and may engage in “world politics” — has no choice in this matter. (Weber, 
1994: 129) 5
As Sven Eliason (2012: 148) wrote, “Weber understood that great political achievement 
ordinarily involved risky choices . . . perhaps Weber can be said to have miscalculated he 
risks of Caesarism. If so, the lesson is that politics as rational calculation may prematurely 
foreclose genuine and preferable possibilities . . .” 6
For Weber rationalization meant, among other things, bureaucracy and the threat of 
what he called rule by officials (Beamtenherrschaft). In a much-cited passage he wrote: 
Das Entscheidende bliebe doch: daß diese »frei« schaffende Verwaltung (und even-
tuell: Rechtssprechung) nicht, wie wir das bei den vorbürokratischen Formen fin-
den werden, ein Reich der freien Willkür und Gnade, der persönlich motivierten 
Gunst und Bewertung bilden würde. Sondern daß stets als Norm des Verhaltens die 
Herrschaft und rationale Abwägung »sachlicher« Zwecke und die Hingabe an sie 
besteht. Auf dem Gebiet der staatlichen Verwaltung speziell gilt . . . der . . . spezi-
fisch moderne, streng »sachliche« Gedanke der »Staatsraison«. . . . Entscheidend ist 
für uns is nur: daß prinzipiell hinter jeder Tat echt bürokratischer Verwaltung ein 
System rational diskutabler »Gründe«, d.h. entweder: Subsumtion unter Normen, 
oder: Abwägung von Zwecken und Mitteln steht. (Weber, 1976: 564)
Decisive is that this “freely” creative administration (and possibly judicature) would 
not constitute a realm of free, arbitrary action and discretion, of personally motivat-
ed favor and valuation, such as we shall find to be the case among pre-bureaucratic 
forms. The rule and the rational pursuit of “objective” purposes, as well as devotion 
to these, would always constitute the norm of conduct. Precisely those views which 
most strongly glorify the “creative discretion of the official accept, as the ultimate 
and highest lodestar for his behavior in public administration, the specifically mod-
ern and strictly “objective” idea of raison d’état...The only decisive point for us is that 
in principle a system of rationally debatable “reasons” stands behind every act of 
bureaucratic administration, namely, either subsumption under norms, or a weigh-
ing of ends and means. (Weber, 1968: 979)
Here too rationalization and raison d’état go together in Weber’s analysis. 7
5. See Lukács, 1962: 65; Schroeder, 1998.
6. See Palonen, 1998: 11.
7. In a little-known PhD thesis Maurice Weyembergh (1971) discussed the connection between rational-
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The tension between bureaucratic rule and political leadership is a topos of the We-
ber-industry. Behind it is another tension: that between ethics and politics as a whole, 
confronting modern citizens with an existential choice. The Canadian theorist Richard 
Wellen writes of Weber: 
. . . contemporary philosophers have had to confront his view that Western culture 
has tied itself to a course of rationalization distinguished by the tension between 
ethics and the other spheres, and that out of this has emerged a dualism between 
the goods of individuality and those of power and organization. <. . .>
Max Weber proposed that a certain kind of victory had been achieved by liber-
alism in the process of rationalization that has brought about the disenchantment 
of the world. At the same time he described this as a hollow victory, since liberalism 
has survived in a world in which its moral claims have become less salient than its 
(possible) functional advantages . . . a culturally successful liberal democracy could 
at most provide a context for a struggle between bureaucrats and leaders. (Wellen 
1996: 57, 160)
Willen (Ibid.: 105) attempts, following Habermas, to develop a deeper legitimation 
basis for liberal democracy: “.  .  .  it is important to see that communicative action, in 
Habermas’s sense, must be appreciated for its potential to foster normative demands — 
irreducible to those of strategic action — upon the rational development of social institu-
tions and procedures.” It may indeed be possible to combine an active communicative 
public sphere with Weber’s vision, even if Weber himself could hardly imagine it (Shils, 
1987). There is a report in the Viennese “Neue Freie Presse” of a lecture in which Weber 
allegedly presented the possibility of a democratic variant of his ideal types of legitimacy. 8
My focus here is however on another dimension of this issue: Weber’s criticism of 
political “dilettantism” and his problematic concept of “leadership democracy” (Führer-
demokratie). To put it briefly, the trend so far this century seems to be towards the com-
bination of nationalism with plebiscitary and often populist appeals to the “will of the 
people” (Weale, 2018) 9, as expressed in often manipulated but semidemocratic elections 
(Isaac, 2017). This cult of the “mandate” is taken to legitimate attempts to sweep aside 
legal and/or parliamentary obstacles. There are prominent examples in postcommunist 
Hungary (changes to the constitution, subversion of the media) and Poland (attacks on 
judges) but also in the more established and until recently apparently stable democracies 
of the USA (Trump’s obstruction of justice and declarations of states of emergency) and 
the UK (May’s attempts to exclude parliament from the Article 50 notification, with the 
ization and his political views, as expressed for example in his earlier writings such as his Freiburg inaugural 
lecture and his first article on the stock exchange (1894), in which he saw speculation as a necessary evil: “Une 
fois de plus, la science est mise au service de la politique, sans pour autant lui être subordonnée . . . La bourse 
constitue en quelque sorte un mal regrettable auquel il faut se résigner” (p. 115). See also Turner and Factor 
(1989).
8. Ein Vortrag Mar Webers über die Probleme der Staatssoziologie. Neue Freie Presse, 1917, no 19102, Oc-
tober 26, p. 10 (http://anno.onb.ac.at/pdfs/ONB_nfp_19171026.pdf).
9. On populism, see in particular Brubaker (2017).
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judges who blocked this trick branded in the gutter press as “enemies of the people” and 
one of them suffering a homophobic verbal attack).
A relevant element in this context is the concept of “sovereignty.” 10 Weber can serve 
again here as a guide:
Nur ein politisch reifes Volk ist ein »Herrenvolk«: ein Volk heißt das, welches die 
Kontrolle der Verwaltung seiner Angelegenheiten in eigener Hand hält und durch 
seine gewählten Vertreter die Auslese seiner politischen Führer entscheidend mit-
bestimmt. (Weber, 1988: 259)
Only a politically mature people is a “nation of masters” (Herrenvolk), which means 
a people controlling the administration of its affairs itself, and, through its elected 
representative, sharing decisively in the selection of its political leaders. (Weber, 
1994: 269)
It is striking that Weber uses the word “sovereignty” very rarely, although the concept 
is at the center of his sociology of the state and also, I suggest, of his conception or ratio-
nalization. There is a parallel here, as Weichlein (2007: 105) notes, with his conception of 
the “nation,” which is so self-evident for him that he rarely very rarely invokes it explicitly. 
One of his rare explicit remarks, made in an informal conference contribution, is the fol-
lowing: “The nation is an experienced community, whose adequate expression would be 
a state of its own, in other words it normally tends to engender such a state” 11 (Weber, 
1988: 486; Weichlein, 2007: 104). Perry Anderson (1992: 205), drawing the contrast with 
Ernest Gellner, wrote that “Weber was so bewitched by the spell of nationalism that he 
was never able to theorize it . . .”
Sovereignty has become a contemporary shibboleth (Conti, Di Mauro, Memolo, 
2018), for example in the Brexit slogan “take back control,” 12 in Trump’s apotheosis of the 
already well-established US suspicion of multilateral obligations, and in the protests of 
the Polish, Hungarian, Russian and Chinese regimes against external criticism in relation 
to the rule of law and human rights. 13 The importance of the concept was brought home 
to me as I edited a book on Brexit in the autumn of 2016. The only contributor who saw 
possible advantages in Brexit was Stefan Auer (who graciously described himself as the 
“dissident”). In his contribution Auer stressed this aspect and the possibility of Britain es-
caping from what he and Nicole Scicluna (2017) described as the “sovereignty paradox”: 
“. . . member states have ceded too much control to the supranational level to be able to 
set effective policies in important areas independently of each other and of the European 
10. The Council of European Studies has chosen as its 2019 conference theme “Sovereignties in Contention: 
Nations, Regions and Citizens in Europe.”
11. “Die Nation ist eine gefühlsmassige Gemeinschaft, deren adäquater Ausdruck ein eigener Staat wäre, 
die also normalerweise die Tendenz hat, einen solchen aus sich hervorzutreiben.”
12. As I wrote this sentence (May 23, 2019), the latest Brexiteer minister to resign from Theresa May’s 
doomed cabinet cited as her first reason for doing so: “I do not believe that we will be a truly sovereign United 
Kingdom through the deal that is now proposed.”
13. On Russia, see, for example, Blakkisrud and Gasimov (2018).
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institutions. Yet they retain enough initiative to resist compromise and thwart common 
solutions” (Auer 2017: 50).
Scicluna (2017: 113–114) illustrates this with the euro crisis: 
. . . national governments cannot succeed alone, yet they struggle to effectively coop-
erate…the failure to bring EMU fully within the constitutional paradigm in which 
laws are made following the community method . . . undermined the ECB’s single 
monetary policy over a number of years, leading to the crisis. The crisis, in turn, has 
undermined the EU’s constitutional balance, insofar as solutions have been sought 
outside the framework of EU treaty law (e.g. the Fiscal Compact which was adopted 
as an international treaty, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was 
established as an intergovernmental institution . . .
Other contributors took a more skeptical view. The sociologist of law Chris Thornhill 
(2017: 79), argued that “the classical doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has lost much 
of its plausibility.” He and also Antje Wiener (2017: 145) stress that the Brexit contro-
versy had opened up the contradiction in the unwritten British constitution between 
parliamentary and plebiscitary democracy. For Craig Calhoun (2017: 60) “[t]he Brexit 
campaign .  .  . played on an old idea of sovereignty, old English ideas about the differ-
ence between the island nation and the mainland of Europe, alarm over immigrants, and 
claims that the UK was somehow subsidising Europe.”
The contemporary controversy over the relevance of sovereignty has a longer history. 
One of the first contributions to the British discussion is by Noel Malcolm (1991), cur-
rently one of the few academic supporters of Brexit. 14 It is interesting that a defender of 
state sovereignty, the jurist Dieter Grimm (2009) emphasizes the numerous limits put on 
it by the UN and WTO as well as the EU. For EU member states he sees Neil MacCor-
mick’s “post-sovereignty” as a possible future, but also the disappearance of sovereignty 
altogether (Grimm, 2015: 117). For the moment, however, “sovereignty protects democ-
racy” (Ibid.: 128). Martti Koskenniemi (2010: 242) also ends his rather skeptical discus-
sion on a positive note: “. . . sovereignty points to the possibility . . . that one is not just a 
pawn in someone else’s game.”
Arjun Appadurai (2017: 2–3) has deconstructed the myth of sovereignty: 
Economic sovereignty, as a basis for national sovereignty, was always a dubious 
principle. Today, it is increasingly irrelevant.
In the absence of any national economy that modern states can protect and de-
velop, it is no surprise that there has been a worldwide tendency in effective states 
and in many aspiring social movements to perform national sovereignty by turn-
ing towards cultural majoritarianism, ethno-nationalism and the stifling of internal 
intellectual and cultural dissent. In other words, the loss of economic sovereignty 
everywhere produces a shift towards emphasizing cultural sovereignty.
14. Malcolm, 2019; see also MacCormick, 1999; Held, 2002; Walker, 2003; Kalmo, Skinner, 2010.
RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 2019. VOL. 18. NO 2 23
Against this, Appadurai suggests, we need a “liberal multitude’ as an answer to this 
“regressive multitude.” 15 On the other hand, DiEM25 (Democracy in Europe Movement 
2025) takes sovereignty seriously, as noted by Paul Blokker (2019: 345, 347): “Transnation-
al populism lifts the struggle over popular sovereignty to the transnational level, where 
the action is .  .  . DiEM25 does not deny the national altogether, but rather calls for a 
democratic strengthening of sovereignty on both the national and transnational levels.” 
Monnet’s warning in 1943 however remains relevant:
Il n’y aura pas de paix en Europe si les États se reconstituent sur une base de souve-
raineté nationale avec ce que cela entraîne de politique de prestige et de protection 
économique . . . Les pays d’Europe sont trop étroits pour assurer à leurs peuples la 
prospérité que les conditions modernes rendent possible et par conséquent néces-
saire. 16
There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the basis of na-
tional sovereignty, with all that that entails in terms of prestige politics and eco-
nomic protectionism . . . The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their 
peoples the prosperity that modern conditions make possible and consequently 
necessary.
Richard Kuper (1996: 153–154) concludes: “The very desperation with which many 
nation states are clinging on to their “sovereignty” is, I believe, an indication of the extent 
to which it has already been eroded — from above and below as well as by the emergence 
of non-state forms of authority . . .” 17 Colin Crouch (2019b: 3) agrees: “Sovereign nation-
alism can play with flags and anthems, and spend the time hating immigrants, refugees 
and international organizations, leaving the global economy free.” Richard Bellamy (2017: 
228) aptly characterizes the way the Brexit government responded to Dani Rodrik’s tri-
lemma (the difficulty of combining globalization, national sovereignty and democracy): 
“They have delivered a formal facade of national sovereignty, symbolized by certain im-
migration controls...combined with a total openness to global economic processes over 
which they will have little or no democratic control.”
Whether this delivery does in fact take place still remains uncertain. The reason for 
citing Brexit as an example is, I think, that it offers a particularly crass example of the 
contradiction between rationalization and an ethic of responsibility on the one hand and 
an ethic of conviction on the other. As in the (much more serious) case of climate change, 
manifest dangers are played down or simply denied. A century after his death, Weber’s 
core concepts and preoccupations, though not his answers, remain highly relevant.
15. See also Blühdorn and Butzlaff (2019).
16. Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet (Alger, 5 août 1943). Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/note_de_
reflexion_de_jean_monnet_alger_5_aout_1943-fr-b61a8924-57bf-4890-9e4b-73bf4d882549.html (accessed 20 
June 2019). See Isikzel, 2017: 140–141.
17. See also Negri, 2010; Isikzel, 2017: 140–141; Patberg, 2019.
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Концепция «Рационализации» Макса Вебера и XXI век
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Веберовская концепция «рационализации» по праву считается основой его зрелой 
мысли. В то же время все большее внимание уделяется его «двойственному» отношению 
к рационализации экономических, административных и политических процессов, как 
и жизненного поведения в целом. Проблематика национализма и иррациональных 
тенденций сложной фигуры Вебера также выступает все более заметно. Хотя национализм 
сам по себе не может быть иррациональным, любой националист логически вынужден 
(по крайней мере, в качестве принципа) признать законность других — возможно, 
противостоящих ему — национализмов. Вебер пытался избежать этого парадокса 
в рассмотрении национализма, подчеркивая особую ответственность крупных государств, 
тем не менее включая проблематичное понятие Herrenvolk. В данной статье рассматриваются 
национализм по Веберу и современные националистические и популистские движения 
в свете его концепции суверенитета, демократии и плебисцитарного лидерства 
(Führerdemokratie). Автор полагает, что в XXI веке «суверенитет» превратился 
в предрассудок — в особенности в таких странах, как США, Россия, Турция, Венгрия 
и Польша, а также Великобритания в условиях текущего краха. Хотя Вебер редко использует 
понятие суверенитета, оно является центральным в его социологии государства, а также, 
как полагает автор, в его концепции рационализации. В статье также проводится параллель 
с тем, как Вебер использует понятие «нация». 
Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, рационализация, национализм, суверенность демократия, 
популизм
